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BOOK REVIEWS
CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS,
ADDICTS, AND PUSHERS. By Thomas Szasz. New York: Anchor
Books. 1975. Pp. xvii + 218. Paper. $2.95.
Reviewed by Michael Lee Pinkerton*
Dr. Thomas Szasz, Professor of Psychiatry at the State
University of New York, is best known as a prolific and contro-
versial author. Szasz' forte has always been challenging sacro-
sanct root assumptions and exploding well-accepted myths,
and in Ceremonial Chemistry he is at his best. In this complex
and ambitious book he analyzes the concept of drug addiction
and arrives at the unorthodox conclusion that:
there is, in fact, no such thing as "drug addiction." To be
sure, some people do take drugs that the authorities do not
want them to take; and some people do become used to
taking certain substances, or become habituated to them;
and the various substances which people take may be legal
or illegal, relatively harmless or quite harmful. But the
difference between someone "using a drug" and his being
"addicted" to it is not a matter of fact, but a matter of our
moral attitude and political strategy toward him.'
At its most basic level this book is an examination of the
social process of identifying deviant elements in society and
"scapegoating" them. In ancient times the values used to iden-
tify deviants were religious in nature,2 but Szasz contends that
scientific values have come to replace those of the bankrupt
religious world-view.3 Szasz attacks the use of scientific positiv-
ism to identify deviants, and both the medical and legal profes-
sions are on the receiving end of his vituperous polemics; the
former for being among the chief promoters of this phenome-
non, and the latter for legitimating it and not protecting the
individual from the resulting government encroachment. The
law's unquestioning acceptance of positivism and its medical
* Deputy State Public Defender, Sacramento, California; B.A., 1973, University
of Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; Member,
California State Bar.
1. T. SZASZ, CERMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS,
AND PUSHERS 50 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SzAsz].
2. Id. at 18-26.
3. Id. at 26-34.
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progeny is exemplified by statutory schemes that are ulti-
mately based upon the medical model of "mental illness"
and/or "competency."' Characteristic features of such legisla-
tion are provisions for involuntary civil commitment 5 and non-
consensual treatment.'
While such paternalistic laws are intended to help those
who are subjected to their application, Dr. Szasz has consis-
tently maintained that their inevitable effect is an erosion of
personal autonomy, and a mechanical non-humanistic concep-
tion of mankind
The casual reader of Szasz may be tempted to classify him
as a conventional civil libertarian. This is mistaken.
An account of the drug problem from a conventional civil
liberties perspective might run as follows: Persons for various
reasons use drugs that are pharmacologically addictive. After
a period of time the user becomes an addict-one who is suffer-
ing from a disease-and is no longer responsible for his or her
actions.' This sets the stage for the state, acting pusuant to a
parens partriae rationale, to intervene into the lives of the ad-
dict and those who furnish the drug.
Black markets develop to supply the illegal drug. Because
the supply has been artificially reduced by government inter-
vention into the marketplace, selling the drug becomes a high
risk profession, the price becomes exorbitant. The addict may
find that crimes against property and persons are the most
convenient way of obtaining the money needed to pay the re-
sulting inflated prices. Because the drug is not manufactured
and distributed with the same quality controls that prescrip-
tion drugs are, the product is adulterated and of variable
strength. This is one major source of the drug related health
problems.
4. See, e.g., CAL. W". & INST. CODE § 5325 et seq. (West 1970).
5. See Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emer-
gency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379 (1973).
6. For different approaches to the consensual treatment issue see Barnhart,
Pinkerton & Roth, Informed Consent to Organic Behavior Control, 17 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 39 (1977); Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and
the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237 (1974).
7. SzAsz at 143-64.
8. PoLicY GUIDE OF THE AMEmCAN CIVIL LIBEiTIEs UNION, Policy No. 213 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ACLU]. See also Mr. Justice Douglas' concurrence in Robinson
v. California, 360 U.S. 660, 673 (1962): "But we do know that there is 'a hard core' of
choronic and incurable drug addicts who, in reality, have lost their power of self-
control."
9. See N. KITTRE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971).
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It is important to note that this conventional civil liberties
view does not question the pivotal assumptions inherent in the
drug problem: disease, addiction and parens patriae. The usual
recommendation to the legislatures is voluntary treatment
rather than punishment for the addict, and lighter prison sent-
ences for the pusher.'0
But Szasz' treatment of these themes is much less compro-
mising. This work is a tapestry of interwoven threads that must
be carefully unraveled in order to appreciate their full import.
His earlier works reject both the notion of "disease" to explain
human problems" and the parens patriae model of government
as a cure for such a "disease."1 In this book he goes further,
and probes into the commonly accepted assumption that
addiction is primarily physiological and pharmacological. Dr.
Szasz asserts that "our ideas about and interventions in drug
taking behavior have only the most tenuous connection with
the actual pharmacological properties of 'dangerous drugs'."' 3
Historically, various drugs have been promoted and
prohibited (scapegoated) not for reasons of health, but for rea-
sons that Szasz argues are social and moral." When this pro-
cess of promotion and prohibition is viewed through the value
structure of the deterministic philosophy of positivism (which
serves as the underpinnings of medical science), those persons
who use disapproved drugs are also scapegoated and viewed as
"addicts." That is, one who has no free will vis-a-vis the drug,
and is driven by irrestible impulses.
However, when this promotion/prohibition sequence is
analyzed from a non-positivist stance where the salient as-
sumptions are freewill and human responsibility, the result is
entirely different. Szasz contends that
addictions are habits; that habits enable us to do some
things, and disable us from doing others; and hence, that
we may, and indeed must, judge addictions as good or bad
according to the value we place on what they enable us to
do or disable us from doing. Furthermore, what any partic-
ular habit enables a person to do, or disables him from
10. ACLU, Policies No. 213, 214.
11. T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
12. T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963).
13. Szasz, at 169.
14. Id. at 69-81 where it is argued that opium prohibition in the United States
was originally racially and economically motivated.
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doing, may-as we have seen-be either a matter of fact
or a matter of attribution."1
The biographies of persons as diverse as Sigmund Freud'"
and Malcom X17 are used by Szasz to demystify drugs and to
support his arguments. Both used narcotics for a long period
of time; they viewed their habits as enabling them to function
in a desirable manner; and both quit using drugs when they
came to regard their habits as dysfunctional.
Based on his analysis of the dynamics of drug use, Dr.
Szasz concludes that capitalistic individualism and tolerance
of deviation provides the most realistic resolution of the drug
"problem." Concretely, this means "control not of the drug
user but of those who would control how he ought to use
drugs."'' 8 This amounts to the abolition of drug control laws and
free market sale of these pharmacological agents. This
libertarian solution maximizes individual freedom (in both the
economic and personal spheres) and responsibility. It is not an
argument promoting drug use, but a call for the individual to
accept responsibility for his or her actions, and for the govern-
ment to leave the individual alone except where he or she has
caused actual, not metaphorical, harm to others. These are, in
Szasz' words, the "inalienable rights and irrepudiable duties'"9
of a citizen. Stripped to essentials, the precise object of his
attack is excessive government intervention into individuals'
lives; the central polemic is authority versus autonomy-
external control versus self-control.
The major flaw of this work is the author's occasional tend-
ency to overstate his case for the sake of rhetorical impact. As
a result, the casual reader may misinterpret him and certain
segments of the legal community tend to dismiss him in an off-
hand fashion. However, his semantic sword has cut both ways;
there has been a growing concern in both the legislative and
judicial arenas concerning the rights of hospital and mental
patients. This is attributable in no small part to the works of
Dr. Szasz.
Szasz sharply challenges lawyers, jurists and legislators to
modify the system, as there are many laws based on the parens
15. Id. at 79.
16. Id. at 69-78.
17. Id. at 82-86.
18. Id. at xvii.
19. Id. at 170.
20. See, e.g., R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STAT., AND UTOPIA (1974).
[Vol. 17
BOOK REVIEWS
patriae doctrine and positivistic conceptions of human prob-
lems-laws which inevitably restrict economic freedom and
civil liberties and which are generally unquestioned by those
who create and enforce them. Szasz is speaking from a
respectable political and social-scientific2' tradition, a tradi-
tion that the legal community should not ignore. At the very
least, we have the duty to critically examine these issues. As
Robert M. Hutchins has observed:
The intellectual community has to think together about
important matters: the law is the application of thought to
what is perhaps the most important of all matters, the
regulation and direction of the common life .... Since law
is architectonic, which means that it shapes the conduct
of society, everything in the society is relevant to it.2
The abridgment of the rights of a free people is not to be
taken lightly. Laws which restrict our freedom should be care-
fully scrutinized in order to determine whether they are fulfill-
ing a legitimate purpose. Szasz' book gives us a fresh and
cogent perspective from which to examine our current addic-
tion to drug laws.
21. See, e.g., Q. LAUER, PHENOMENOLOGY: ITS GENESIS AND PROSPECT (1965).
22. Quoted in W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 170 (1974).
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SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board of Education
AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY. By Richard
Kluger. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1976. Pp. x + 823. Cloth.
$15.95.
Reviewed by Richard L. Kuersteiner*
In Simple Justice Richard Kluger has presented a compre-
hensive, carefully documented analysis of the complex cultural
tapestry surrounding the landmark Supreme Court decision of
Brown v. Board of Education.' This momentous holding
sounded the death knell for the long established, but pernicious
practice of racial segregation in the public schools of America.
Brown has been given far-reaching applicability and has, in
effect, "wiped out all forms of state-sanctioned segregation."'
Prior to the Brown decision, blacks in America had been
relegated to an inferior status. Kluger points out that at the
time of the American Revolution slaves comprised nearly one-
fifth of the country's population. Since there was concern that
"the thinking slave was a potentially rebellious slave,"3 the
black codes in effect in the South prohibited teaching blacks
to read or write. Thus, when America was founded most blacks
were denied not only their freedom, but also all educational
opportunities. In the 1857 decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, the
Supreme Court held that blacks were "beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to re-
spect."4
The Emancipation Proclamation signed by President Lin-
coln in 1863 purported to free all slaves in rebel states. After
the Civil War this proclamation was followed by the adoption
of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion which abolished slavery and guaranteed the equal protec-
tion of the laws to all citizens of the United States. The Civil
Rights Acts of 1870 and 1875 guaranteed privileges such as the
* Counsel, Western Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command; B.A., 1961,
Washington and Lee University; J.D., 1964, University of Florida; Member, Florida
Bar and United States Supreme Court Bar.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The companion case to Brown was Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
2. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 750 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SIMPLE JUSTICE].
3. Id. at 28.
4. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See SIMPLE JUSTICE at 39.
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right to buy and sell property, to enforce contracts, and to have
a jury trial that was fair.,
As the nineteenth century was drawing to a close, the legal
stage was set for the American black to move forward on an
equal footing with whites. However, economically and socially
he was not, in the minds of those who controlled the power
structure in America, ready to take his place with the white
man. As a manifestation of this view, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Plessy v. Ferguson' upheld a Louisiana statute
that required railway companies to provide "equal but separate
accommodations for the white, and colored races"7 and made
it a crime for a person to insist "on occupying a coach or com-
partment other than the one set apart for his race." 8 Although
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
contained sweeping language guaranteeing freedom and equal
protection of the laws to all Americans, a new legal concept, the
separate but equal doctrine, had been officially adopted as the
law of the land. An examination of subsequent American his-
tory shows how difficult it was for black Americans to overcome
the pervasive effects of a tradition of non-education as embod-
ied in the black codes, of perceived inferiority and unfitness to
associate with whites as articulated in the Dred Scott decision,
and of an official sanction to segregate by providing separate
but equal facilities under the rationale of the Plessy decision.
In order to overcome these obstacles, talented, determined
black leaders arose to organize and chart the course towards
true equal protection under the law. William E. Du Bois was
such a leader. After attending Fisk University near Nashville,
Tennessee, he won a scholarship to Harvard where he studied
philosophy and was one of five commencement speakers. He
studied at the University of Berlin and then returned to Amer-
ica in 1895 to become the first black to earn a Ph.D. from
Harvard. In 1905 on the banks of Niagara Falls, Du Bois met
with twenty-nine carefully selected blacks and founded the
Niagara Movement. This was the precursor of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People which he
helped organize in 1910. Du Bois became the "director of pub-
5. Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 14 (1870) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1971 et. seq. 1970)); Act of 1875, ch. 114, §§ 3-5, 18 Stat. 336-37 (1875)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1970)).
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Id. at 541.
8. Id. at 537.
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licity and research"' for the NAACP and established a maga-
zine called The Crisis which eventually reached a circulation
of more than 100,000. His article on the fire lynching of a black
in Pennsylvania shows the tenor of his writing and reflects his
views on the prevailing zeitgeist:
Ah, the splendor of the Sunday night dance. The flames
beat and curled against the moonlit sky. The church bells
chimed. The scorched and crooked thing, self-wounded
and chained to his cot, crawled to the edge of the ash
with a stifled groan, but the brave and sturdy farmers
pricked him back with the bloody pitchforks until the deed
was done.
Some foolish people think of punishing the he-
roic mob, and the governor of Pennsylvania seems to be
real provoked. We hasten to assure our readers that noth-
ing will be done. . . . But let every black American gird
up his loins. The great day is coming. 0
Unfortunately, the great day was still in the distant future,
but other leaders were emerging. One such leader was Charles
H. Houston, a black from Washington, D.C. He studied law at
Harvard, and was greatly influenced by Professor Felix Frank-
furter, and was elected to the Harvard Law Review. He gradu-
ated in the upper five percent of his class, remained a year to
pursue a Doctor of Juridical Science degree which he received
in 1923, and then studied at the University of Madrid where
he was awarded a Doctor of Civil Law. Upon returning to
Washington he was admitted to the District of Columbia bar
where he joined his father in the practice of law.
Howard University established in Washington as a black
school in 1867, had been, in Kluger's words "an academic slum
since its founding."" Black intellectuals referred to it as a
"Dummies' Retreat."'" Yet many of America's black profes-
sionals had been trained at Howard. In 1926 Mordecai John-
son, a Baptist minister, became the first black president of
Howard-a man determined to make it an outstanding univer-
sity. He selected Charles Houston as the new dean of the law
school. Houston wasted little time in cleaning house and bring-
ing in first-rate black legal scholars. During his six year tenure
as dean he tightened admission standards, built up the sadly
9. SIMPLE JUSTICE at 98.
10. Id. at 99.
11. Id. at 124.
12. Id. at 123.
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lacking library, and dramatically improved the quality of its
students and of the legal education they received. Howard Law
School became highly involved in the civil rights movement
and worked closely with the New York headquarters of the
NAACP.
With the founding and funding of the NAACP Legal De-
fense and Education Fund in 1939, the American black now
had filled his quiver with the arrows needed to begin a serious
legal attack on the Plessy rationale and the long line of segrega-
tion cases that had relied on the separate but equal doctrine.
Thurgood Marshall, who had graduated as valedictorian from
Howard Law School in 1933, became chief counsel of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Working in concert with other
Legal Defense Fund attorneys such as James M. Nabrit, Jr.,
and William T. Coleman, Jr., and with psychologist Kenneth
B. Clark, a strategy was devised for attacking the legality of
segregated school facilities. The strategy involved the use of a
"two-string bow' ' 3 in order to end "doghouse education.""4 On
the one hand evidence was adduced showing that the racially
separate facilities provided by various school districts were
equal in name only. The per capita expenditure of funds for
teaching white pupils was generally much greater than for
blacks, and the Jim Crow physical facilities provided for blacks
were often sadly inferior. In addition, the strategy called for the
utilization of the second argument, that separate facilities are
inherently unequal. In order to prove that theory it was neces-
sary to utilize the evidence of psychologists and social scientists
to demonstrate the adverse effects of segregation upon black
children who were required to attend only those schools that
had been designated for them.The NAACP attempted to show
empirically that the effect of segregation on black children was
a lack of self esteem, and that this lack of esteem was harmful
to the psychological well being and fulfillment of the children
involved.
In 1951 and 1952 five different class action cases were
instituted in order to challenge head-on the legality of racial
segregation in the public schools. 5 After appropriate lower
court proceedings and appeals (the plaintiffs lost in four of the
five cases), the Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and con-
13. Id. at 293.
14. Id. at 302.




solidated the cases for hearing. The result after extensive argu-
ment in 1953, and reargument the following term, was the
momentous Brown decision handed down on May 17, 1954. In
an unanimous opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, the Court
declared that
in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate
but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have
been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained
of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
This decision marked the end of an era. Its reverberations were
long and loud.
While it is true that one cannot legislate public mores, it
is even more difficult to change them by judicial fiat. Realizing
the delicacy of the school segregation dilemma, and the inher-
ent human tendency to resist sudden institutional change, the
Justices refused the plaintiffs' request to include an absolute
timetable for school desegregation in the implementation order
for Brown. The court chose instead to remand the cases to the
district courts "to admit to public schools on a racially non-
discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to
these cases."' 7
Viewed in retrospect two decades later, the wisdom of the
deliberate speed rule seems apparent for, as shown by the daily
news media, there have been many problems, both social and
legal, to address in implementing the Supreme Court's guide-
lines. Although discrimination and bigotry probably can never
be totally eliminated, great strides have been made in America
toward establishing racial equality. These advances have oc-
curred, to a large degree, as the result of a chain of events which
began with the emergence and purposeful organizing of black
leaders and the determination of numerous Americans to fight
for an overruling of the Plessy decision and an end to racial
segregation. The Brown decision was the penultimate occurr-
ence that stimulated these changes. Its implementation was
primarily the responsibility of a number of southern United
States district court judges who, for the most part, coura-
geously discharged their duties as the "shock troops of the
16. 347 U.S. 483, 492. See SIMPLE JUSTICE at 782.
17. Id. at 745.
18. J. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWAIRMERS 3 (1974).
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judiciary,"'" by entering the highly charged courtroom arena to
hear and rule upon the welter of school desegregation cases that
ensued.
Richard Kluger spent seven years completing Simple
Justice and the final work product reflects this painstaking
effort. The insight provided into the inner workings of the Su-
preme Court during the give and take of deliberations is of
special interest to lawyers, as is the role of the "Superchief,"
Earl Warren, in obtaining a unanimous decision. This highly
readable book is recommended for both lawyers and laymen
interested in the history of American civil rights. For this is
what Simple Justice is all about.
